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Review
CLASS WARFARE
Did socioeconomic divisions undermine the South?
Sutherland, Daniel E.
Summer 1999

Williams, David Rich Man's War: Class, Caste, and Confederate Defeat in the
Lower Chattahoochee Valley. University of Georgia, ISBN 820320331
There is no mistaking the theme of this passionate book: the Confederacy
lost the Civil War because of the arrogance and avarice of the planter class. The
planters started a conflict that they alone wanted, contends David Williams, and
they did nothing during the course of the rebellion to win the loyalty of the
South's black or poor white populations.
To make his case, Williams explores the course of the war in 13 Georgia
and eight Alabama counties that sat, cheek by jowl, along the southern border of
those two states. "Perhaps nowhere can the decisive role of the economic class
system and the caste system of slavery be viewed more clearly," he asserts in
explaining his choice of location, "than in the lower Chattahoochee River Valley
of Georgia and Alabama." It is not an entirely new proposition.
A region awash in class conflict
Other historians have stressed class divisions in the Confederacy, but none
has done so more fervently or relentlessly than Williams. He draws a portrait of
a region awash in class conflict and caste divisions.
By "caste" Williams generally means racial divisions, but he also believes
that the "South's socioeconomic hierarchy was so rigid that even the white social
structure might be more accurately defined as a caste system in which yeomen
and poor whites had little chance for upward mobility."
Few Southern yeoman, poor whites, or other "plain folk," a group that, for
Williams, also includes small merchants and skilled artisans, thought they had
anything to gain from a war. As increasing numbers of white plain folk and
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slaves turned against the rebel cause, Williams says, the Confederacy faced
certain doom.
The grumbling of soldiers while on campaign, the discontent of their
families at home, the defiance of Confederate deserters, and the expectations of
slaves all convey the mood and emotions of an escalating cycle of rebellion.
Conscription, high taxes, starvation, homelessness, and every form of physical
suffering destroyed whatever vestige of loyalty plain folk may have felt for the
government, especially when they saw planters protecting themselves from these
hardships through hoarding, speculation, and draft evasion. Williams carefully
and convincingly shapes every variety of unhappiness to buttress his
interpretation of a disenchanted region seething with resentment against the
slaveocracy.
There is some truth in all this. As far back as Ella Lonn and Albert B.
Moore, writing in the 1920s, historians have pointed to fissures of discontent and
alienation within the Confederacy. A consistent parade of scholars, including
Frank L. Owsley, E. Merton Coulter, Bell I. Wiley, David H. Donald, and
Richard E. Beringer, et al., in Why the South Lost (1986), have suggested that the
Confederacy may have collapsed as much from lack of unity on the home front
as from battlefield defeats. Still, Williams has gone a step beyond all of them,
even advocates of the class conflict thesis, in stressing the definitive impact of
the rebellious plain folk. Unhappily, his argument is weakened by a number of
unresolved questions and contradictions.
Most obviously, Williams overgeneralizes to a precarious degree. Rather
than sticking to events on the lower Chattahoochee and restricting his
conclusions to that region, he makes sweeping statements about the entire South
-- even the North, on occasion -- that he cannot justify. Thus the battle between
union and secession, he says, hinged on class conflict not only along the
Chattahoochee, not only across the entire South, but in the North, too. "The side
that could most successfully, within its own socioeconomic confines, suppress or
redirect class antagonism would emerge the victor," Williams asserts. "It was the
most important challenge faced by either camp."
Williams creates a similar problem when he combines examples of class
conflict from other parts of the South with his analysis of the Chattahoochee.
Even when dealing with Georgia and Alabama, he occasionally strays to towns
and counties that were very different in geography, economic interests, and
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social composition from his region. The impression thus created, whether
accurate or not, is that he must rely on evidence from other areas in order to
make a substantial case for his own counties.
The next most vulnerable spot in Williams's argument concerns the
prevalence of class conflict. Having insisted that class divisions were the most
important factor in Confederate defeat, it is incumbent upon him to provide
absolute connections between the two. Yet Williams too often assumes that
anyone who complained about the Confederacy must necessarily have done so
for reasons of class. This is evident when he discusses desertion and draft
resistance.
Many men deserted, as Williams demonstrates, because of heart-wrenching
appeals from scared and hungry families. But desertion, even when inspired by
such entreaties, cannot automatically be taken as a sign of class resentment, and
desertion did not necessarily mean disloyalty to the Confederacy. Williams also
attributes draft resistance, especially after passage of the twenty-slave law, to
class conflict, even though he acknowledges the deep political resentments
conscription caused and quotes opponents of the draft who spoke in terms of "the
people of Georgia" and "every body," not just poor people.
Confusing class conflict with Unionism
Confusing class conflict with Unionism does not help matters. In describing
the anti-war activities of a local peace society, Williams asserts that "active
membership clearly numbered in the thousands, and thousands more were
sympathetic to the peace movement." Yet this peace society kept no records and
held no regular meetings, which, besides leaving the numbers in doubt, makes it
difficult to attribute conscious class motives to its members.
Similarly, Williams attributes the Confederate election results of 1863,
which saw many pro-secession legislators replaced by anti-war and Unionist
candidates, to "class-based political consciousness." He supports this contention,
in part, by pointing to the success of the Mechanics' and Working Men's ticket in
the city elections of Columbus, Georgia. Yet Columbus had the "largest
concentration of Unionists" in the valley, and half of the city's skilled workers -who, one assumes, would have formed the core of the Mechanics' ticket -- had
been born outside the South. Consequently, class may have had something to do
with political opinions in Columbus, but other factors were clearly at work too.
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Chattahoochee is overshadowed
In tying racial caste to Confederate defeat, Williams sides with those
historians who believe that slaves played an active role in liberating themselves,
a not unreasonable assertion within certain constraints. Williams relies heavily,
as do most historians who discuss this elusive subject, on the WPA slave
narratives, and he feels confident enough in his findings to assert that "the black
caste's collective antagonism contributed as much as that of whites to
Confederate defeat."
Yet this conclusion, even more than his emphasis on class antagonism,
seems strained. Large parts of his argument -- those dealing with runaway slaves,
insubordination toward masters, and the role of blacks in the Union army -- have
little if anything to do with events in the lower Chattahoochee.
All this is not meant to disparage the obvious diligence of his research or the
clarity of his writing, only to warn readers that in his enthusiasm to draw
meaningful -- not to say controversial -- conclusions Williams sometimes claims
too much. He uses a sledgehammer where finesse is required, and the
consequences too frequently batter the more praiseworthy aspects of his work.
Daniel E. Sutherland is professor of history at the University of Arkansas
and author of nine books, including Guerillas, Unionists, and Violence on the
Confederate Home Front.
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